Peer-Reviewed Journal Details
Mandatory Fields
Elgie, R;McMenamin, I
2005
July
British Journal of Political Science
Credible commitment, political uncertainty or policy complexity? Explaining variations in the independence of non-majoritarian institutions in France
Published
48 ()
Optional Fields
REGULATORY AGENCIES DELEGATION
35
531
548
A common feature of contemporary political systems is the increasing amount of delegation from governments to non-majoritarian institutions. Governments may decide to delegate authority to such institutions for reasons relating to credible commitments, political uncertainty and policy complexity. This article focuses on Independent Administrative Authorities (Autorites administratives independantes) in France. We demonstrate that these institutions enjoy varying degrees of independence. We find that the degree of independence varies as a function of two factors: the need to make a credible commitment in areas subject to market opening and the complexity of policy in particular areas.
NEW YORK
0007-1234
10.1017/S0007123405000281
Grant Details